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Chapter 10 
Stanley Rosen: The Nemesis of Nihilism 
Nalin Ranasinghe, Assumption College 
Although his writing style has changed more than once, Rosen has always 
sought to defend the lifeline between cosmos and logos; he has always insisted 
that the bond between philosophy and ordinary language is sacred and indis-
soluble. From this vantage his amazing ability to yoke together and drive the 
unruly black horse of ordinary language and the ideal steed of metaphysics 
seems godlike. Accordingly, bearing in mind his teacher's famous assertion that 
the depth of things resides precisely in their surfaces, it is appropriate that my 
tribute by should begin by describing Stanley Rosen in the place where his un-
surpassed mastery of both philosophy and ordinary language are most evident: 
the classroom. 
I first took a class with Stanley Rosen almost twenty years ago, at Penn 
State, in the fall of 1985. What transpired in Rosen's seminar that afternoon was 
something that I have never experienced, either before or since, with any other 
teacher. My other instructors that semester were Joseph Kocklemans and the late 
David Lachterman, professors of rare erudition perfectly capable of making dif-
ficult texts clear and accessible. However, only Rosen, could seamlessly inte-
grate philosophy into ordinary experience while enormously enriching his stu-
dents' awareness of both. He was an amazing combination of Platonist, stand-up 
: comedian, Dutch uncle and social commentator. Like Socrates, he could bring 
philosophy down from the heavens and do the most difficult topics justice in the 
language of the agora-or gridiron. His students saw that Rosen came before 
them neither to praise ordinary language-at the expense of philosophy, nor to 
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bury it-in abstract jargon. Rosen made me aware of how flat and stale it was to 
make a living by opposing philosophy to everyday life; Platonism, as he embod-
ied it, was distinguished by a robust sense of reality. A philosopher who cannot 
use the direct evidence of the everyday exercise of reason to justify the good life 
is worse than useless; he is dangerous. 
This is why Rosen, America's most distinguished Platonist, has made it his 
mission to ceaselessly warn against the nihilistic foundations of what his teacher 
memorably called "the joyless quest for joy." By thoughtlessly denouncing the 
so-called elitist experience of excellence, our egalitarian ethos is powerless to 
defend the very virtues that must sustain a democracy. For one thing, any talk of 
high and low, noble and base or good and evil is expressed purely in terms of 
selfishness, sentimentality or superstition. Alternately, and even more danger-
ously, any "value language" that cannot be quantified is deemed either meaning-
less or, horror of horrors, judgmental. Consequently we find ourselves "thrown" 
in a world in which ordinary speech is hopelessly incompatible with the techni-
cal jargon and quantitative measurements that rule and constitute the increas-
ingly artificial and illusory everyday reality we dwell in. Yet Rosen does not 
zestfully denounce Modernity in the stern constipated tones of Cato the Elder; 
self-consciously anachronistic speech only serves to widen the gap between 
eternal verities and present-day exigencies. He is of the view that human beings 
can only maintain the essential connection between reason and the good by liv-
ing the good life in the present. Ancient self-knowledge and Modern liberality 
cannot be understood as virtues that mutually exclude each other. 
Rosen's metaphysics of the ordinary becomes startling relevant when we 
realize that the hundreds of billions spent on weapons that could blow our planet 
up many times over are as inconceivable in terms of human experience as the 
immeasurably tiny particles of matter and energy used by computer technology 
to hold our world together. Reality today is such that even the President of the 
United States cannot hope to master all the data at his disposal and gain an accu-
rate world-view without a large number of advisors and advisors of advisors, all 
operating from their own limited and limiting perspectives. Furthermore, by a 
perverse reversal of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle at the macro level, it 
seems inevitable that the very efforts made to measure and report this chaotic 
mass of raw matter itself result in distorted pictures of the whole that only fur-
ther disorient the various entities constituting it. Consequently order, no matter 
how arbitrary or violent, is affirmed for its own sake. Renouncing higher notions 
of justice and personal integrity, both the technocratic West and the fundamen-
talist East shamelessly kneel before the altar of necessity. Human society be-
comes generic and machine-friendly, and the loudly proclaimed advances in 
cloning only promise to superficially embody what educational institutions have 
been doing to the minds of impressionable students for many decades. Under 
these conditions, when nobility and even uncorrupted speech seem to be all but 
impossible, a man who can practice ordinary language to remind us of virtue and 
excellence can only be compared to Tiresias in the Underworld: "alone retaining 
his wits while the others flitted around like shadows." Yet such is the dis-ease of 
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this state that even many students fear those rare teachers who can deliver them 
from Hades. 
For fifty years, Stanley Rosen has unceremoniously dragged thousands of 
students out of the ghetto of jargon and compelled them to speak and think in 
ordinary language. This is why many righteously tolerant academics have been 
appalled by his use of "judgmental" language and unprofessional examples to 
gratuitously indicate the nihilistic foundations of their schizophrenic existence. 
Now, as then, many highly intelligent students of philosophy prove to be utterly 
incapable of living their lives in accordance with the principles they pay lip ser-
vice to in academese. Nihilism, an unbalanced disposition towards reality, which 
often results from a death-obsessed "care" or ego-maniacal authenticity, is pre-
ferred over the "logocentric" procedures of judgment and rank ordering that 
provide meaning and virtue in a world conspicuously deficient in both qualities. 
Unfortunately, the question of whether "being judgmental" is worse than being a 
hypocrite is one that few care to address in our simultaneously over-tolerant and 
over-righteous times. 
Many students (and professors) still view philosophy as a disease (or way of 
being articulately neurotic) that they just happen to be good at. Of course, this 
sophisticated diaresis finds has no way of distinguishing between Wittgenstein 
and Woody Allen-and perhaps it shouldn't. In other words, philosophy be-
comes just a means of paying one's bills; the unquestioned end is normalcy-
understood in the most banal and mimetic terms. Any setback will cause phi-
losophers of this variety to not unhappily pursue some other, often more lucra-
tive, career path that would better advance either "family values" or Epicurean 
lifestyles. Furthermore, following the example of Wittgenstein and the Logical 
Positivists it has become acceptable, and indeed downright philanthropic, for 
philosophers to set about the liquidation of philosophy itself-with a view to 
delivering normal people from its annoying questions and perplexities. Unfortu-
nately, this Socratic "speed-bump" is the last obstacle to the flattening out of 
everyday reality and its rapid bifurcation into the mutually inclusive extremes of 
McWorld and Jihad. 
By inconsiderately philosophizing in everyday language Rosen makes it far 
harder for his audience to maintain a "double-truth" relationship between phi-
losophy and everyday existence. He has never treated philosophy as a language 
game that is played strictly within the pages of scholarly journals and becomes 
irrelevant or dangerous the moment we re-enter the real world of Xanthippe and 
Crito. The Good must have precedence over Being, even in our thoroughly his-
toricized surroundings. Indeed, one could argue that Rosen has always followed 
Zarathustra' s imperative to "be faithful to the earth" and never been seduced by 
ontic or even ontological exigency. Whilst those least worthy of philosophy only 
pursue it instrumentally, better but more timorous scholars have sought to make 
the world safe for philosophy and only succeeded in debasing both philosophy 
and the world. Vigorously eschewing both of these false oppositions, Rosen 
believes that true philosophers can and must justify existence through their "ro-
bust sense of reality." It follows that "rank-ordering" is an essential aspect of the 
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distinctive manner in which a philosopher views the world and judges that it is 
still possible to practice virtue. Even though seeing things as they are is certainly 
not easy, and the task frequently seems to be as impossible as it was for Socrates 
or Rousseau to penetrate the encrusted outer shell of Glaucus, Rosen points us 
towards an abiding structure that, in his own words "isn't the eternal order but 
yet is the natural foundation for willing the eternal order to be." 1 It is noteworthy 
that despite the cryptic language, this formulation is far more positive than its 
equivalent in Strauss's thought: eternally recurrent problems that let philoso-
phers stand beyond good and evil to rescue us from the chaotic mire of histori-
cism. By his emphasis on this structure that allows noble deeds and thoughtful 
words to remain timelessly meaningful, Rosen defends the reality of both ordi-
nary language and human virtue. 
Furthermore, despite his passionate interest in moral and political questions, 
Rosen has consistently been critical of irrationalism and skepticism; both poses 
conveniently conclude that "everything but judgmental language is permitted" 
once we are either desperate or "cool" enough to assume the absurdity of exis-
tence or the final inaccessibility of ultimate reality. As a result, the world is de-
livered up to extremists on both ends of the political spectrum. Contrariwise, 
throughout his extraordinarily successful and productive career Rosen has dem-
onstrated that ordinary language is sufficient to guide human life when it is gov-
erned by rational judgment-rather than mindless imitation. Conversely, ideas 
and facts cannot be separated from each other without consequences even more 
dangerous than those following the splitting of the atom. Neither does Rosen's 
model of human existence place man somewhere between an illusory physical 
world and a wholly transcendent heaven; he prefers to derive the ideas used to 
measure qualitative excellence from human cognitive activity itself- thus de-
riving depth from surface. In this important regard he once again separates him-
self from those who pride themselves on their ability to create values ex-nihilo 
by imposing order on the chaotic hyle of reality. Rosen's scathing criticisms of 
historicism and pseudo-aristocratic nihilism are founded in his recognition that it 
is possible for human beings to take their stand in the real world and resist both 
fundamentalism and sophistry. 
Stanley Rosen, a self-described New Deal Democrat, has remained constant 
in his political views while instructing three generations of students. Tempera-
mentally unsuited to occupy the Vicarage of Bray, he has never failed to warn 
against the worst tendencies of the ideology most in vogue among his students-
even at the risk of being associated with political views that he is least sympa-
thetic towards. His characteristic defense of prudence in eloquent but seemingly 
immoderate language has very little resemblance to our contemporary tendency 
to use insidious methods to promote extremism. Far from being the kind of man 
who would prescribe Nazism to ward against the corruption of Weimar, his 
criticisms of nihilism and Post-Modernism have always been undertaken in the 
name of moderate enlightenment. It is far nobler to be a Platonist accused of 
sounding like a Nietzschean than to be a Nietzschean impersonating a Platonist. 
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Rosen's well-known unwillingness to suffer fools gladly derives precisely 
from his awareness that many fools are yet capable of excellence; he does not 
allow a false sense of charity to alienate him (or them) from the exper:ence of 
quality in the world. His high expectations of others have always been accom-
panied by genuine authenticity in personal relations with individuals. Having 
been educated in the company of many truly brilliant eccentrics at the University 
of Chicago in its glory days, and being himself the possessor of an artistic tem-
perament, Rosen has always understood the thin line that separates genius from 
madness. He has never mistaken an artful plodder with a high IQ for a genuine 
philosopher. In a situation where students typically expect professors to be either 
their equal or an unapproachable superior, Rosen has refused to play either role 
for the sake of gaining drinking-buddies or disciples. Differently put, he has 
never been known to be afraid of being himself or of speaking his mind. Conse-
quent to this refusal to conform to stereotype, humorless students (and col-
leagues) at both extremes have decided that he is either unprofessional or an 
elitist. Their pathetic inability to appreciate Rosen's unsurpassed sense of humor 
has always served as a kind of pons asinorum separating the children who ap-
proach him from the goats, sheep, camels and lions making up the intellectual 
order of rank. By refusing to take himself too seriously, and by never seeking to 
make disciples, Stanley Rosen always pointed beyond himself. The exaggera-
tions and self-caricatures that made members of the afore-mentioned menagerie 
regard him as an egomaniac were in fact the productions of an artist always 
keenly aware of the enigmatic relationship between image and original. It fol-
lowed sadly but necessarily that those incapable of understanding this basic Pla-
tonic distinction proved that they were unworthy of studying with our greatest 
living Platonist. Some of the most egregious misinterpretations of Plato have 
been committed by persons firmly convinced that a philosopher will never write 
or speak humorously. 
Of course, any talk concerning Stanley Rosen and student teacher relation-
ships is necessary incomplete without a discussion of his attitude towards his 
own teacher, Leo Strauss. Since much of Rosen's own work could be regarded 
as an ongoing response to certain fundamental themes in Strauss's work, and 
because Rosen himself has had much to say about his former teacher, we could 
gain valuable insights into the thought of both thinkers by directly addressing 
this topic. Accordingly, this will be the theme of the second half of this introduc-
tion. Just as Strauss's amazing success as a teacher is attested to by the large 
number of disciples garnered by this unprepossessing man, the strange fact that 
the charismatic and ebullient Stanley Rosen has actively refused to make disci-
ples says a great deal about his deepest philosophical beliefs. 
Rosen first met Strauss in 1949 shortly after the latter had moved to the 
University of Chicago after over a decade at the New School for Social Re-
search in New York City. Rosen at the time regarded himself as a poet. He was 
also busily engaged in completing the requirements for a Bachelor's degree 
from Chicago in one year a feat that was also performed by his distinguished 
contemporary Seth Benardete. Rosen's hilarious account of his encounter with 
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Strauss awaits publication, but it suffices to state that on the occasion of their 
first meeting, after having introduced himself as a poet, he responded to 
Strauss's inquiry whether he knew what Plato said about poets by saying that he 
didn't care because as a poet he knew more about his art than Plato possibly 
could. This was the unpromising beginning of a very long and animated conver-
sation that ended with an invitation to study with Strauss. 
It is highly significant that Rosen was one of a very small number from the 
Philosophy Department at Chicago to attend Strauss' s lectures; Richard Rorty 
was another. Most of the participants were either from Strauss's own department 
of political science or the Committee on Social Thought. Among these were 
intellectual luminaries such as Seth Benardete, Victor Gourevitch, Muhsin Ma-
hdi, and Allan Bloom. Rosen was also the only one of Strauss's students to 
come to him from poetry. This fact is of course not unrelated to Rosen's interest 
in language and its, often tenuous, relationship to everyday reality. By his own 
account, he was also initially virtually uninterested in politics,2 an attribute that, 
needless to say, also separated him from the vast majority of those who attached 
themselves to Strauss. Put differently, one could say that he preferred to study 
causes rather than effects; it has been noted on many occasions that Rosen's 
interests in metaphysics and epistemology also make him almost unique among 
Strauss's students. Because of his departmental affiliation, every official course 
offered by Strauss had to do with political science; however there were several 
private groups reading philosophical and theological works that he presided over 
as well. 
By his own admission, Rosen attended virtually every meeting of Strauss' s 
seminars over the five years he spent as a graduate student at the University of 
Chicago. It was soon readily apparent to him that Strauss "transcended the fac-
ulty members of the philosophy department in virtually every significant way." 
Accordingly, after taking his master's degree, Rosen transferred to the Commit-
tee on Social Thought where he was able to write a dissertation on Spinoza un-
der the supervision of Leo Strauss. Shortly after completing his degree, marry-
ing, and spending a year in Greece, Rosen secured employment at the Pennsyl-
vania State University and left Chicago. This did not however end his associa-
tion with Strauss. They corresponded often by letter and in 1958 Strauss visited 
Rosen and his wife at State College, Pennsylvania. Strauss, who had often de-
fended Rosen against criticisms concerning his student's colorful temperament 
by giving assurances that he was "getting better," was very pleased at his stu-
dent's success. He is said to have boasted to colleagues in Chicago that Rosen 
had "made it" and was now the proud owner of a house and automobile. Rosen 
continued to visit Strauss on many occasions, the last such visit taking place 
shortly before the latter's death in 1973. On that occasion, upon hearing that 
Rosen was preparing a book on Hegel, the ailing teacher pointed him towards 
what turned out to be a vitally important passage in the Greater Logic. This in-
cident confirmed Rosen's adamantly held conviction that Strauss's true genius 
was to be found neither in his pronouncements as a statesman or prophet, nor in 
his metaphysical or poetic powers, but in his remarkable ability to read a text. 
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Rosen has stated elsewhere that Strauss rescued him as a teenager from a 
"transcendentally grounded nihilism." While he came to share a number of his 
teacher's central views and retained many of them throughout his life, Rosen 
says was never at any time a "Straussian."3 Strauss never required him to be-
come a Straussian "as a price for the extraordinary benefits he bestowed on his 
students."4 Despite fully acknowledging how much he benefited from Strauss's 
immense learning and "sober madness" Rosen believed that there were certain 
important differences, largely concerning the issue of esotericism, which caused 
him to separate himself from the Straussian mainstream. As readers of his nu-
merous books and articles are well aware, Rosen is in considerable sympathy 
with the courage and generosity animating the "Modems" in their revolution 
against tradition and nature. Yet Strauss, who according to Rosen regarded 
courage as the lowest of virtues,5 was often critical of what he perceived as 
Rosen's excessive boldness. It is worth repeating the expression 'epater le bour-
geois' (shocking the bourgeoisie) that summed up Strauss's disapproving opin-
ion of his student's more exoteric writing style.6 As Rosen's student, I am tem-
peramentally incapable of not drawing attention to the obvious inference that 
this criticism had more to do with style than substance. 
Even though Rosen's celebrated book Nihilism was written to work out the 
general features of Strauss's analysis of the nihilistic roots of modem philoso-
phy, its "spiritual father," while commending the work highly, also commented 
that he himself lacked the courage to write such a book. 7 This goes to the heart 
of the fundamental difference between Strauss, a refugee from Nazi Germany, 
and Rosen, a native of Cleveland Ohio. Strauss had served in the German Army 
in occupied Belgium during the unprecedented carnage of the Great War; he had 
also lost all of the members of his family who remained in Germany to the 
Holocaust. It is easy to see why the author of such works as Persecution and the 
Art of Writing, a man who rediscovered the long forgotten art of esotericism by 
reading heretical political theologians, preferred not to express his truest opin-
ions freely on most matters of importance. The question as to whether this had 
to do more with temperament, personal safety (lack of courage) or fear of cor-
rupting his readers (epater le bourgeois) cannot be answered conclusively or in 
mutually exclusive terms. It is also not unrelated to their different views on 
whether it is more desirable and or practical to gain fame or disciples. There are 
reasons for and against the belief that Strauss, the prudent Ancient, obeyed the 
Greek warning against seeking fame in one's own lifespan. It is likewise unclear 
whether Rosen, the courageous and generous Modem, embraced Machiavelli's 
advice to trust in his own arms-even if they held Fortuna within them. 
While Rosen has always defended the phenomenon of esoteric writing, it is 
his contention that our plight today is such that 'shocking the bourgeoisie' is far 
less dangerous than allowing them to persist in complacently nihilistic modes 
and orders already producing a cultural and economic meltdown. Put bluntly, 
esoteric writing is useless in a decadent time where success is measured by 
power, rather than wisdom, and even the best students are barely literate, cer-
tainly not pious, and often incapable of ever being more than good students. 
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Consequently, the true meaning of Strauss's teachings failed to reach the best 
minds and most able politicians of the present day. Importing esotericism to 
America is ultimately almost as quixotic as transplanting democracy in Iraq; in 
both cases one can best deflect the accusation of esoteric knavery by drawing 
attention to exoteric folly. 
An emphasis on rigorous interpretive procedures aiming at the utmost clar-
ity, ultimately expressed in ordinary language, rather than reliance upon oracular 
pronouncements and/or dogmatic assumptions concerning perfectly constructed 
texts that could only be decoded by infallible interpreters, starkly distinguishes 
Rosen's approach from methods common to both Heideggereans and Straus-
sians. These procedures only separate student from interpreter while promoting 
the latter to an intellectual pantheon that confirms their qualitative kinship with 
the Ancients: "Where I go, you cannot follow." Additionally, dogmatic doc-
trines concerning perfect texts tend to create subterranean virtual realities pre-
sided over by sophistical shadow-shapers. The idea that there is only one perfect 
unchanging esoteric doctrine beyond good and evil denies the reality of the pro-
ductive disagreements between equally great thinkers that have contributed so 
much to Western Civilization. It also deprives writers from past times of what 
while they would most desire in ours: intelligent readers capable of ascending 
from the signifier and sign-painter to the signified. The idea that Shakespeare 
could only have learned about the soul by reading Xenophon and Thucydides by 
candlelight denies the possibility that an intelligent man could gain much wis-
dom by observing human affairs. It is far more plausible that Shakespeare and 
other great minds gained access to that "natural foundation for willing the eter-
nal order to be" that Rosen alludes to. 
It is quite obvious that many great writers write in such a way that the 
deeper implications of their works would only be apparent to more astute read-
ers. However, the view that great works are flawless masterpieces of logo-
graphic necessity takes away the only quality that makes interpersonal commu-
nication of goodness truth and beauty between very different times and places 
possible: shared finite humanity. Consequently, a certain kind of historicism, 
based upon dark oracles concerning the withdrawal of Being or caves below 
caves, necessitates revelatory exegesis by a superhuman mediator when unnec-
essarily befuddled students cry out "Only a god can enlighten us!" Conversely, 
by refusing to resort to obscurantism, and providing constant verbal and non-
verbal reminders of his robust humanity, Stanley Rosen has never 'her-
menutered' his students and left them incapable of reading for themselves. He 
recalls Strauss smiling broadly and quoting Nietszche's assertion that the best 
thing a student can do for his teacher is to kill him. Teacher-student relationships 
modeled after the doctrine of original sin, which opens up an infinite moral and 
qualitative abyss between creator and creation, are not appropriate in rational-
as opposed to revelatory--contexts. In other words, teachers who produce disci-
plined disciples often cast a long shadow that makes emulation of the master's 
virtue by the disciples, or even recognition of it by later generations, all but im-
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possible. Shakespeare put it best in Julius Caesar: "The evil that men do lives 
after them; the good is oft interred with their bones." 
Rosen has stated that Leo Strauss "regarded Heidegger as the enemy of the 
heritage of Platonism in the late Modern world." Accordingly, he sought to "in-
oculate his students against Heidegger by training them in the Platonic tradi-
tion. "8 It was in the service of this cause that Rosen published two works that 
took direct aim at Heidegger: Nihilism and A Question of Being. Yet Rosen's 
singular experience was that Strauss very rarely mentioned Heidegger by name, 
even in private conversations and reading groups, and never referred to Heideg-
gerean texts.9 It was only shortly after leaving Chicago that Rosen became aware 
of Strauss's lecture An Introduction to Heideggerian Existentialism a revised 
version of which was published by Thomas Pangle in 1989. This document con-
cludes with a description of Heideggerean Being or Esse as a synthesis of the 
Platonic Ideas and the Biblical God. Esse is said to be as impersonal as the for-
mer and as elusive as the latter. 10 It is exceedingly curious that Strauss himself, 
in his famous 1953 lecture Progress or Return? claimed that the secret of the 
vitality of the West depended on the continuance of the unresolved conflict be-
tween Reason and Revelation, Jerusalem and Athens. 11 Bearing in mind Hei-
degger's famous pronouncement in his Introduction to Metaphysics (also pub-
lished in 1953) that the idea of a Christian Philosophy was about as meaningful 
as a round square, 12 we must entertain seriously Rosen's thought that, despite 
their respective foci on ontology and politics, the man his teacher called "the 
only great thinker in our time," 13 exerted a great deal of influence on Leo 
Strauss. 14 Did Strauss believe in either the round or the square? Does he sub-
scribe to the Nietzschean view that a culture is created ex nihilo out of the dia-
lectical interaction between two fictions? Or did he follow Heidegger's example 
and effectively function as a revelatory interpreter? 
Perhaps we could say that Strauss, who claimed to be only a scholar, 15 re-
jected the poisoned chalice of Reason and preferred to find upright shelter in the 
enduring stormy tension between the impersonal and the elusive. In less poetic 
words, he preferred political philosophy to metaphysics. Viewed in this light, it 
is likely that his setting up of the famous quarrel between the Ancients and 
, Moderns was undertaken with the intention of reconfiguring the debris remain-
ing from Heidegger's destruktion of the Western Tradition in a way that pro-
tected the West from the consequences of nihilistic enlightenment. This solution 
amounted to forcing both Faith and Reason to co-operatively assume defensive 
postures against their common enemy, the juggernaut of technology, instead of 
exposing each other's offensive deficiencies. Unfortunately, the exigencies of 
the Cold War forced the West to embrace this very enemy in self-defense. Hei-
degger warned against this danger, but of course his own doctrines had contrib-
uted greatly towards the Western Tradition's weakened condition. Rosen him-
self believes that Strauss was imprudently prudent "too pessimistic concerning 
human creativity, too enamored of nature and so too forgetful of the fact that 
, nature is both good and bad" 16 to employ a more positive attitude towards Cali-
ban-like modernity. While we deplore the liberal tendency to celebrate raw po-
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tentiality as actuality, this is no reason to embrace the conservative fallacy of 
justifying, anointing and acclaiming what is as what ought to be. This is but an-
other form of historicist fatalism. While they might flatter the rich and pander to 
the powerful, language games of this kind can only breed hubris and stupidity in 
the real world. 
Strauss's preoccupation with such theorists of strife as Thucydides, Hobbes 
and Machiavelli, as well as his preference for those two noted anti-Socratics 
Aristophanes and Nietzsche, justify the inference that he esteemed the Ancients 
for their noble pessimism than out of any belief in the classical good life. This 
view is also supported by the fact that his celebrated re-discovery of Platonic 
political philosophy occurred through the esoteric, atheistic, and decidedly pes-
simistic medium of Islamic political thought. While Strauss's call for the revival 
of spiritedness was altogether justified in dark days of the Cold War, Cassandra-
like, he drowned out his own warnings that the less immediate but gravest 
threats were posed by intellectual and religious decadence. In our present hege-
monic predicament the unformed ambition of Alcibiades is more dangerous than 
the prudent timidity of Nicias. When our foes are unified by their hatred of us, 
we can no longer depend on our enemies to remind us of our virtues. 
Leo Strauss's prudent interpretations of old, esoteric, texts have little to say 
to our unlettered, thoughtless and thoroughly exoteric times. His praise of mar-
tial virtue seems redundant besides our sanguine bellicosity, and his guarded 
revelations of well-concealed wickedness fail to shock our shameless and insa-
tiable appetites. The sad truth is that all attempts to reproduce the singular vir-
tues of this great exegete have been markedly unsuccessful. Mindless imitation 
of ideal hierarchical relationships between infinitely wise oracular teachers, no-
ble young aristocrats, and invincibly ignorant Hoi Polloi do little good and gen-
erate a great deal of mischief in our cynical, illiterate, and thoroughly materialis-
tic society. Today, the grand alliance promoted by Strauss between Reason and 
Revelation yields a distressingly large harvest of knowledgeable knaves, lustful 
libertarians and fanatical fools. By contrast Rosen's accounts of the essential 
connection between Reason and the Good provides a richly comprehensive 
erotic Platonism that is agreeable to the generous heart and fevered temperament 
of modernity. He believes that poetry can mediate successfully between sad rea-
son and crass politics 17 and he has shown that a new robust metaphysic can be 
derived from the enduring phenomena of ordinary experience. While fully aware 
that nihilism is a permanent human possibility, Rosen's speech and deeds are 
animated by his confidence that humans are not inherently incapable of the self-
knowledge needed to educate their desires and lead a good life. In one of the 
most beautiful passages of Nihilism he stirringly reminds us of the contagious 
example of a virtuous human being: 
The good man ... is not "useful for ... " in the same sense that tools, food, acts 
even just and beautiful things exhibit utility ... there is a certain fulfillment, 
completeness, or perfection which shines forth from such a man, and which we 
too admire, even perhaps without envy or desire because of its splendor. This is 
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what we mean by "genuine goodness" or "purity of character." The shining of a 
good man's splendor may illuminate and help us to complete our own lives, 
whether by virtue of its nobility, or because we are able to see better what to do 
ourselves when that noble light permeates the otherwise dark contours of our 
lives. 18 
215 
These winged words best express what Stanley Rosen has meant to many of his 
students. 
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